來源：財經會議圈

　　拆解史上最大IPO背後的資本收割遊戲

　　華盛頓的「攔路虎」

　　2026年6月11日，就在SpaceX距離正式登陸納斯達克僅剩不到24小時之際，一封火藥味十足的12頁信函直抵美國證券交易委員會（SEC）。

　　發信人不是別人，正是以「華爾街死敵」著稱的民主黨參議員伊麗莎白·沃倫（Elizabeth Warren）。她在信中措辭激烈地要求SEC：必須推遲SpaceX的IPO上市，這場「史上最大規模IPO」對投資者保護和市場完整性構成了前所未有的威脅。

　　沃倫在信中寫下了一句振聾發聵的警告：

「你們必須推遲該登記聲明的生效時間。SpaceX的IPO創造了一個新問題：它正在操縱主要的股市指數，強迫數百萬投資指數基金的普通散戶在別無選擇的情況下，被迫承擔SpaceX的巨大風險。」

　　這話聽起來刺耳，但細看SpaceX的上市設計，你會發現沃倫的擔憂絕非杞人憂天。

　　離譜的「一口價」

　　135美元的愛買不買

　　傳統IPO的玩法，大家都懂：投行先給一個價格區間，比如100-120美元，然後根據市場認購情況最終定價，這叫「價格發現」。

　　但SpaceX不玩這一套。

　　它直接甩出135美元/股的「一口價」，愛買不買。

　　這在華爾街歷史上極為罕見。一家公司估值高達1.75萬億-2萬億美元，卻連最基本的市場博弈定價環節都省了，擺明了就是「我說多少就是多少」。

　　更離譜的是散戶分配比例。

　　美股常規IPO，散戶份額通常只有5%-10%，絕大多數份額都會留給長期持有的機構基石投資者。但SpaceX反其道而行之，將30%的IPO份額分配給散戶，金額高達225億美元。

　　外界普遍吹捧這是「讓利散戶、共享紅利」，但內行看門道：

• 機構投資者追求長期穩定、風險可控，是市場的壓艙石；

• 散戶受情緒、輿論、偶像濾鏡驅動，盲目跟風、追漲殺跌，波動率極高。

　　馬斯克擁有龐大的粉絲群體，他們會自發造勢、無腦買入，短期強行推高股價。但後續只要出現任何負面輿情，即便公司基本面毫無變化，股價也會因為散戶情緒崩塌而大幅跳水。

　　參考歷史案例：Robinhood曾將35%新股份額分給散戶，上市後被散戶爆炒至85美元，熱度褪去後半年暴跌至15美元，高位接盤散戶全線深套。

　　SpaceX本次散戶佔比極高，未來必然復刻同款走勢：短期情緒拉漲，長期散戶買單。

　　估值泡沫

　　市銷率100倍的天方夜譚

　　SpaceX的估值到底有多離譜？我們來看看硬數據。

　　2025年，SpaceX全年營收187億美元，估值卻突破1.75萬億美元，市銷率接近100倍。

　　做個對比：

• AI龍頭Anthropic估值近萬億美元，市銷率僅21倍；

• OpenAI市銷率也只有34倍；

• 這兩家AI企業的營收增速，遠高於SpaceX，估值倍數卻遠低於它。

　　對比之下就能發現，所謂的AI泡沫，和SpaceX的估值泡沫相比，根本不值一提。

　　更誇張的是，招股書中宣稱公司遠期潛在市場規模（TAM）高達28.5萬億美元。這個數字是什麼概念？遠超中國全年20萬億級的GDP體量，完全脫離現實商業邏輯，純屬誇張造勢。

　　還有馬斯克的薪酬解鎖條件：授予其10億股、價值約6000億美元的股權，解鎖要求包括：

　　公司市值突破7.5萬億美元；

　　完成火星移民核心佈局；

　　在火星落地100萬常住人口。

　　這在任何理性投資者看來，都是天方夜譚。但這就是投行的基本功：用專業模型、海量數據、行業術語，把虛無縹緲的故事包裝得邏輯自洽、看似可行。

　　「包子式」包裝

　　用星鏈包裹xAI的資本遊戲

　　從一線ECM投行分析師的內行視角來看，SpaceX的估值邏輯本質上是一套「層層嵌套打包」模式：

　　用盈利穩定、現金流優質的星鏈業務，包裹業績慘淡、無法獨立上市的xAI業務，形成「優質資產兜底、劣質資產掛靠」的包子式結構。

　　來看2025年的真實財務數據：

• 星鏈部門：收入114億美元，盈利72億美元（唯一優質資產）；

• 火箭發射部門：收入41億美元，虧損6.62億美元；

• xAI部門：收入13億美元，虧損130億美元（純純的包袱）。

　　看似三大核心業務協同發力，實則只有星鏈是核心盈利資產，其餘業務均為虧損包袱。

　　這套打包模式還實現了「廢物利用、稅務套利」：xAI常年持續虧損，單獨運營會導致大量稅務抵扣額度作廢。而通過整體打包上市，所有虧損額度均可併入主體財報，合法抵扣利潤、降低整體稅負。

　　這就是華爾街的真實玩法：所謂的公允估值、專業模型，從來不是測算出來的，而是機構之間反覆扯皮、博弈、妥協出來的「市場公約數」。

　　納斯達克的「規則特供」

　　被動資金接盤局

　　為了確保上市成功，這次IPO的設計可謂是煞費苦心，其中最爭議的莫過於納斯達克專門為SpaceX修改規則。

　　規則修改內容：將納入納斯達克100指數的時間從3個月縮短至15天，而且是加權納入（權重不合理拉高3倍）。

　　這意味着什麼？

　　美國有大量被動指數基金、養老基金、401K退休金賬戶，會自動買入納斯達克100成分股。也就是說，只要熬過15天，就可以用老百姓的養老金來給SpaceX接盤了。

　　據測算，僅被動基金強制配置的資金就高達100-200億美元。

　　精明的資金早已提前佈局：提前低價建倉，等待指數納入、被動資金進場後高位套現。疊加散戶狂熱搶購、主動基金佈局、中東熱錢湧入，上市初期流通股稀缺，股價必然被暴力拉升，製造極致的賺錢效應。

　　這場狂歡的終極劇本，早已註定：

　　上市拉升後，馬斯克、早期股東、核心員工會通過新股增發、股票質押貸款等方式持續套現（馬斯克歷來偏好質押套現，特斯拉時期亦是如此）。內部利益方離場完畢後，股價終將回歸基本面，所有浮虧、泡沫風險，全部由後進場的機構和散戶承接。

　　而這些機構資金，本質也是普通人的養老錢、理財錢。

　　星鏈業務遇瓶頸

　　對美軍「趁火打劫」

　　很多人不知道的是，星鏈業務已經觸及瓶頸，連帶火箭發射業務的未來訂單也存疑。

　　來看數據：

• 2025年一季度，星鏈用戶規模1030萬，比去年翻了一倍，但前一年可是翻了三倍的，增速明顯下滑；

• 更可怕的是增長是怎麼來的？平均每用戶收入（ARPU）從2023年的99美元/月降到2024年的91美元，再降到2025年的80美元，到2025年一季度已經暴降至66美元。

　　完全是靠降價換量、打價格戰！

　　原因不難理解：如果你住在紐約、東京、上海，根本不會用星鏈。星鏈就是給偏遠地區用的，但偏遠地區之所以偏遠，就是因為人少。To C端增長見頂了。

　　那怎麼辦？只能對軍方漲價。

　　前段時間美軍在戰場大量使用名為「盧卡斯」的一次性無人機，內置星鏈終端。前線激戰正酣，SpaceX突然要求將網絡費用翻5倍，從原先的5000美元/月直接漲到25000美元/月。

　　理由是：你原本買的是「地面套餐」，實際用在飛行器上，就得按「飛行器套餐」付款。

　　結果服軟的居然是美軍！媒體詢問負責人，他只說SpaceX依然是「穩固可靠的長期合作伙伴」。

　　這件事充分說明：SpaceX已經具備對軍方的議價能力，但這也暴露出其實體業務增長乏力的尷尬現實。

　　沃倫的三大「地雷」指控

　　沃倫在致SEC的信中，詳細列舉了SpaceX在財務和治理上的三大「地雷」：

　　1． xAI收購案可能存在會計造假或估值誤導

　　SpaceX收購馬斯克另一家公司xAI的過程中，交易定價是否公允？是否存在通過關聯交易轉移利益？這些問題都需要SEC徹查。

　　2． 馬斯克個人利益與公司利益存在嚴重衝突

　　馬斯克同時是SpaceX和xAI的大股東，兩家公司之間的交易，本質上是「左手倒右手」。這種利益輸送的風險，在IPO招股書中是否被充分披露？

　　3． 馬斯克在公司內部擁有獨斷專行的權力，缺乏有效制衡

　　目前馬斯克手握SpaceX 82%的投票權，意味着這家近2萬億估值的行業巨頭，完全由他一人掌控，沒有任何機構或股東能夠制衡、干預。

　　成也創始人，險也創始人。 過去兩年，馬斯克極度癡迷AI和太空數據中心賽道，這意味着未來很長一段時間，SpaceX將持續投入鉅額資本用於新業務研發和佈局，重資產投入之下，戰略失誤、投入失敗的風險極高。

　　資本慌亂

　　為什麼急着上市？

　　很多人會問：SpaceX明明可以不用上市，為什麼馬斯克這麼着急？

　　答案很簡單：這不是企業發展需要，而是資本的集體慌亂。

　　原因一：全球風投行業迎來數十年最嚴峻的退出危機

　　世界經濟論壇5月發布的最新數據顯示：

• 當前全球未上市的獨角獸企業中，20%已成立超15年，59%已成立超10年；

• 企業從種子輪到首輪退出的周期，相比2022年拉長了45%。

　　行業常規規則裏，風投基金對LP的承諾退出周期僅為10年。這意味着，超半數獨角獸早已超出約定退出期限，大量風投資金長期被套牢。

　　原因二：AI行業極度燒錢，孖展窗口期短暫

　　OpenAI去年虧損超80億美元，Anthropic去年虧損超30億美元，且兩家企業未來數年仍將持續大額燒錢。

　　業內普遍認為，AI行業泡沫已然存在，只是沒人能精準預判破裂時間。馬斯克急於落地IPO，就是為了搶佔高位窗口期，鎖定萬億估值，提前規避後續市場下跌風險。

　　原因三：搶佔AI資本紅利的末班車

　　當下是全球市場對AI概念溢價最高、資金最狂熱的階段。SpaceX搶先完成IPO，能夠率先吸乾華爾街所有AI+太空賽道的增量資金。

　　高端資本博弈向來樸素：先到先得、先上市先收割。

　　三個階段：看清洗牌時刻

　　SpaceX上市必須看準三個階段：

　　第一階段：看上市當天能否不破發

　　如果流通盤這麼小（僅釋放5%股份）、承銷團這麼強、機構認購這麼熱還能破發，說明市場其實已經虛透了。

　　第二階段：看上市後15到30天

　　能否順利納入納斯達克100指數，把籌碼成功交給被動基金（養老金）。

　　第三階段：看半年後大股東解禁

　　5%的流通比例意味着95%的股份在IPO時處於鎖定狀態。半年後（12月初），這些股份將解除鎖定。那些在幾十億、幾百億估值時入場的早期股東，將面臨十幾倍、幾十倍甚至上百倍的暴利退出機會。

　　那將是怎樣的一場腥風血雨？

　　誰是最大的贏家？

　　這場頂級資本盛宴裏，收益圈層極度分化。

　　真正的贏家只有三類：

　　持股42%的馬斯克本人——上市後財富將突破萬億級，成為全球首位萬億富翁；

　　合計持股10%-15%的公司核心員工——早期入局，成本極低；

　　早期入局的風投機構與股東——終於等到退出時刻。

　　除此之外，21家承銷投行是最大的隱形贏家。

　　今年投行行業普遍低迷、降薪裁員，而SpaceX這一個超級項目，就能讓所有參與投行團隊超額盈利。後續還能持續解鎖二級市場增發、可轉債、併購交易、大宗交易、股票回購等持續業務，堪稱投行的「年度飛升項目」，一年頂往年五年收益。

　　而輸家呢？

　　所有脫離基本面的高估值狂歡，最終都會迴歸均值。狂歡落幕之後，永遠是後進場的普通人承擔所有風險。

　　歷史的輪迴

　　運河狂熱與太空泡沫

　　最後，讓我們用一個經典歷史案例幫大家看懂本質。

　　19世紀全球掀起運河狂熱，蘇伊士運河、巴拿馬運河開鑿前夕，無數法國中產瘋狂募資入局。最終巴拿馬運河公司1889年破產，初代投資者盡數血本無歸。

　　但運河最終成功通航，徹底改寫了全球貿易格局，造福了後續上百年的全球經濟和無數行業。可初代的基建投資者，幾乎沒有喫到任何時代紅利。

　　如今的SpaceX、追捧它的華爾街資本，何嘗不是當年的運河狂熱？

　　我從不否認SpaceX的偉大，也不否認太空經濟的星辰大海，但作為普通投資者，我們一定要剋制對個人英雄主義的崇拜、對科幻浪漫敘事的盲從。

　　沃倫的警告，不該被忽視

　　SpaceX是實體產業的顛覆者，卻是資本市場的收割者。

　　它用極致務實打破了傳統航天的暴利與僵化，卻用極致資本套路，打造了一場屬於頂級圈層的泡沫盛宴。

　　伊麗莎白·沃倫的警告，不該被忽視。

　　SEC是否會在政治壓力下叫停這場「資本狂歡」？馬斯克將如何反擊這位「死對頭」的狙擊？周五的上市計劃是否會突遭變數？

　　這一切，都將在未來48小時內揭曉。

　　但無論結果如何，普通投資者都應該記住一句話：

　　所有脫離基本面的高估值狂歡，最終都會迴歸均值。狂歡落幕之後，永遠是後進場的普通人承擔所有風險。

　　這是一封美國參議院銀行、住房與城市事務委員會成員伊麗莎白·沃倫（Elizabeth Warren）於2026年6月9日寫給美國證券交易委員會（SEC）主席保羅·阿特金斯（Paul Atkins）的信函，要求SEC推遲SpaceX的IPO註冊聲明生效。

　　以下是全文翻譯：

　　美國參議院銀行、住房與城市事務委員會華盛頓特區 20510-6075

　　2026年6月9日

　　尊敬的保羅·阿特金斯主席： 美國證券交易委員會 東北F街100號 華盛頓特區 20549

　　阿特金斯主席：

　　我懷着極度關切的心情，就太空探索技術公司（Space Exploration Technologies Corp．，簡稱「SpaceX」）即將進行的首次公開募股（IPO）致函您。

　　據報道，由埃隆·馬斯克（Elon Musk）擁有的航空航天和人工智能公司SpaceX，計劃在本月晚些時候以高達2萬億美元的估值向投資者募集高達750億美元——這將使其成為「史上最大規模的股市首秀」。然而，此次IPO似乎對普通投資者及其退休儲蓄構成重大風險，同時為SpaceX內部人士（包括特朗普政府高級官員）帶來巨大利益。

　　與SpaceX公開募股相關的風險源於該公司向證券交易委員會（「SEC」或「委員會」）提交的備案文件及其他公開報道中揭示的一系列問題：首先，SpaceX預計將以約100倍2025年營收的價格發行股票——這一估值倍數幾乎史無前例，需要投資者對AI和太空兩個領域的諸多假設抱以極大信心；其次，非傳統的公司治理結構將使SpaceX首席執行官埃隆·馬斯克擁有前所未有的權力，而投資者獲得的權利將遠低於傳統公開股票購買者通常享有的權利；第三，主要股指提供商正在改寫規則，為SpaceX快速進入其指數——以及驅動數百萬美國人退休儲蓄的投資基金——鋪平道路。

　　最終的結果可能是災難性的：如果SpaceX的估值崩潰，退休人員和家庭的投資者賬戶將遭受損失，且對任何公司不當行為幾乎沒有追索權，而地球上最富有的人則因缺乏監管而變得更加富有。SEC的核心使命是保護投資者，維護公平、有序和高效的市場。鑑於史上最大規模IPO對投資者保護和市場誠信構成的前所未有的威脅，您必須推遲任何加速註冊聲明生效的行為。

　　在允許公司向公衆出售其股票之前，委員會必須考慮「公共利益和投資者保護」。在此過程中，委員會可以審查公司的初步招股說明書，以「確認其是否符合適用的會計標準和聯邦證券法律法規的披露要求」。僅SpaceX IPO的巨大規模，在正常情況下就足以證明SEC進行仔細審查和關注投資者需求的合理性。但這些並非正常情況：諸多額外因素加劇了擔憂，並要求SEC採取行動以履行其投資者保護和市場誠信職責，即推遲註冊聲明的生效。

　　SpaceX的估值與會計

　　SpaceX股票的價值——無論是現在還是可預見的未來——似乎建立在一系列獨特的投機性事件之上。據《金融時報》報道，SpaceX目前的財務狀況「對於計算公司價值毫無用處」，部分原因是評估尚不存在的活動的固有挑戰，但這些活動可能成為一家使命崇高（「將意識之光延伸到星辰」）的公司增長的一部分。據晨星（Morningstar）的一份報告，SpaceX的價值可能不到其1.75萬億美元估值的一半。

　　事實上，「以《金融時報》此前報道的1.75萬億美元估值計算，SpaceX將成為美國股市第七大公司。然而，按每年190億美元的營收排名，它僅位列第200位，與幸運符麥片製造商通用磨坊（General Mills）相當。」市場「從未有過對一隻如此投機卻又如此龐大的股票進行定價的先例」，「最大的問題是，高達1.8萬億美元的估值能否在公開市場中持續」。部分問題在於準確評估SpaceX的崇高目標（包括太空旅行和星際居住）是不可能的。但這也是該公司持續虧損和未能實現過去目標的產物。因此，市場分析師對其目標估值背後的數學邏輯提出了質疑，稱之為「荒謬的」、「煙幕彈式的會計」和「真正脫離現實的」。如果該估值無法持續，選擇以高估值買入的投資者——或因投資於指數基金而被迫買入的投資者，而這些基金本身基於已修改規則以納入SpaceX的指數——將為此付出代價。

　　此外，IPO的估值部分由SpaceX與xAI的2026年合併決定。由於埃隆·馬斯克身處交易雙方，「他親自與自己談判交易，自己設定相對估值，自己簽署合併協議，自己完成交易，然後才告知董事會和股東」。這讓馬斯克有機會將xAI的估值抬高到超過其資產價值的水平——換句話說，單方面決定自己交易的價值——並將其納入即將進行的IPO。SEC應評估SpaceX與xAI之間（以及埃隆·馬斯克控制的其他公司組成的完整網絡）的交易和關係是否因不準確或誤導性的會計或估值而對投資者構成風險。鑑於衆多主動和被動投資者將暴露於SpaceX的風險之下，缺乏基本面支撐的估值可能威脅我們資本市場的完整性和穩定性。

　　SpaceX-xAI合併是馬斯克先生控制的不同商業實體之間一系列共同控制交易中的一例——引發了關於SpaceX未來計劃與其控制的公司進行整合的任何疑問。例如，正如商業媒體推測的那樣，如果特斯拉（Tesla）和SpaceX合併，可能立即觸發馬斯克先生1萬億美元的特斯拉薪酬方案，因為控制權變更條款將取消此前解鎖股票所需的業績條件。將這些新的特斯拉股票轉換為新的SpaceX股票可能對SpaceX股東產生重大影響。如果確實存在將特斯拉和SpaceX合併的計劃，此類計劃應向潛在投資者披露，因為它們應被視為對公司業務戰略和公開募股後續價值具有重大重要性的事項。鑑於SpaceX的S-1備案文件未提及此類合併對SpaceX估值的影響——儘管它承認與馬斯克先生其他企業的業務交易可能發生——SEC應在加速SpaceX註冊聲明生效之前，對馬斯克先生關於其衆多強大企業所有權結構的未來意圖進行徹底調查。

　　IPO後的公司治理

　　IPO還引發擔憂，因為SpaceX的IPO後公司治理結構侵蝕了基本的股東權利，並將非同尋常的公司權力授予馬斯克先生。公開交易公司理應對其股東負責。SpaceX的IPO將顛覆這一模式，股東提供數十億美元的新資本，卻沒有任何對馬斯克先生或公司領導層的問責措施，因為公司「結合了超級投票權股票、強制仲裁、更嚴格的股東提案規則以及德克薩斯州公司法，將控制權賦予SpaceX首席執行官埃隆·馬斯克和其他內部人士。SpaceX還將限制投資者挑戰管理層、在法庭起訴以及強制召開代理權爭奪的能力」。

　　正如領先的公司法學者所言，「即使是馬斯克的崇拜者，也應該對SpaceX的公司治理感到不安」。

　　SpaceX的初步招股說明書表明，公司將維持雙重股權結構，馬斯克先生持有的每一股股票的投票權是向公衆發售的每一股股票的10倍。這種不對稱性將剝奪股東對重大公司決策（如收購、剝離或重組）的任何權力。正如公司招股說明書所承認的，「馬斯克先生將能夠控制需要股東批准的事項的結果」。此外，擬議的公司治理結構實質上剝奪了董事會的管理公司權力，使其無法解僱首席執行官：「馬斯克只能由B類股東多數投票罷免董事長或首席執行官——而他個人控制該股票類別93.6%的股份——實際上保證了他的職位。」正如《金融時報》社論版所言，「傳統的治理制衡幾乎完全缺失……[馬斯克]將對投票權和董事會擁有幾乎不可挑戰的控制權」。

　　問題更加複雜的是，「在其他非典型安排中，SpaceX不計劃讓其董事會多數成員為獨立董事」，包括「不使用獨立董事委員會來決定高管薪酬，這是大多數公司的做法」。馬斯克的地位很可能因其在董事會中強大朋友的存在而得到鞏固，包括安東尼奧·格拉西亞斯（Antonio Gracias）和史蒂夫·尤爾韋森（Steve Jurvetson）。據報道，格拉西亞斯先生和尤爾韋森先生與馬斯克先生私交甚密，並且是GPS信號市場的競爭對手。這引發了公司治理擔憂，並存在違反反壟斷法禁止關聯董事（即公司董事同時擔任其競爭對手董事會成員）的風險。

　　SpaceX還試圖限制股東通過法院獲得法律救濟的途徑。根據其S-1備案文件，SpaceX計劃通過強制大多數股東訴訟進入仲裁程序，使馬斯克免受法律風險——這是一個不公開且系統性地偏向公司利益的過程。重要的是，仲裁將是聯邦證券法下訴訟的唯一選擇，因為德克薩斯州商業法院——SpaceX首選的法律爭議審理地——對相關聯邦證券法沒有管轄權，這與S-1中聲稱該領域法律「尚未確定」的說法相反。雖然該條款最終可能無法執行，但SEC最近推翻了一項長期立場，即IPO中的強制仲裁條款不符合「公共利益和投資者保護」，這才使這種嘗試成為可能。此外，「SpaceX選擇了一項條款，僅允許持有公司3%或以上股份的股東提起所謂的‘派生’訴訟，代表公司起訴董事會或首席執行官——就像在更利於股東的特拉華州，一位小投資者提起的特斯拉薪酬投訴那樣。如果SpaceX達到預期的1.75萬億美元估值，起訴的股東將需要至少525億美元的股份。」SpaceX還打算通過提高股東提案門檻來保護馬斯克對公司的單方面控制權，禁止其大多數投資者強制在股東大會上進行投票。

　　馬斯克先生對SpaceX的權力程度尤其令人擔憂，因為他的利益與SpaceX股東和投資者的利益之間不可避免地會產生衝突。公司招股說明書也承認了這一點：在向SEC提交的修訂文件中，SpaceX承認，「未來可能在我們與馬斯克先生及其擁有或關聯的實體之間，就業務交易、潛在競爭活動或其他商業機會等方面產生利益衝突。在正常業務過程中，我們與其中一些公司進行了各種交易。」它繼續寫道：「馬斯克先生或其關聯方可能不時了解到某些商業機會（如收購機會或技術發展），並可能將這些機會導向他們投資的其他企業，在這種情況下，[投資者]可能無法了解或無法追求此類機會。」招股說明書還詳細說明了馬斯克先生——作為對SpaceX負有受託責任的公司董事——如何也可能擁有與SpaceX競爭的其他公司的資產：

　　根據我們的章程，馬斯克先生及其關聯方不受限制地擁有與我們直接或間接競爭的資產或從事業務，並且沒有義務避免從事與我們相同或類似的業務活動或業務線，包括被視為與我們競爭的業務活動或業務線，或與我們的任何客戶或供應商開展業務。此外，我們過去曾與馬斯克先生關聯的實體進行交易，未來也可能繼續如此。我們可能選擇此類交易，而非追求其他一些股東可能更喜歡或可能比我們選擇追求的機會更具增值性的機會。

　　SpaceX招股說明書的這些條款表明，其IPO將是史上規模最大的，也可能擁有史上最被操縱的公司結構。如果IPO以其當前形式獲批，馬斯克在SpaceX擁有的獨特且不受約束的權力將對投資者、市場和公衆造成嚴重擔憂。此次IPO最終為未來IPO樹立了危險的先例。

　　對被動投資者和資本市場的影響

　　關於SpaceX的估值和公司治理擔憂，如果其IPO註冊聲明的生效被加速，將對市場誠信產生重大擔憂。對於挑選和選擇特月供資的投資者，他們至少能夠避免投資於從事風險或不公平行為的公司。但SpaceX的IPO創造了一個新的擔憂：主要股市指數正在被操縱，以迫使指數基金中的數百萬投資者——這是一種通常成本較低、對散戶投資者有吸引力的投資選擇——投資SpaceX，並在沒有選擇的情況下面臨SpaceX的重大風險。「分析師估計，在納入後的幾個月內，標普500、納斯達克100和羅素1000追蹤器將保守地強制買入150億至300億美元的SpaceX股票，更激進的流通股權重情景則會高得多」。

　　除上述公開交易股票向散戶投資者的超額分配外，SpaceX的IPO還將使被動和主動投資者都面臨重大風險。

　　主要股指有一套明確的規則來確定是否以及何時納入新公司。這些規則為股票購買者提供了重要的投資者保護，使其免受新上市IPO的波動性和不確定性影響，並允許市場發現機制在指數納入之前為公開公司建立公平價格。這些規則通常包括成熟度和可行性要求。例如，標普500要求公司在指數納入前至少公開交易12個月，並且至少連續四個季度實現盈利。

　　但據報道，SpaceX已遊說指數提供商改變其指數納入規則。指數提供商也照辦了，進行了修改，使SpaceX等大型科技公司更容易被快速納入被動投資者的投資組合。4月，標普道瓊斯指數公司宣佈正在考慮修改規則，以便更容易讓「超大市值」（MegaCap）公司——即股市中最大的公司——快速進入其指數。僅就標普500而言，該公司正在考慮的修改包括將標準的12個月IPO後等待期縮短至6個月，取消標準的10%流通股權要求，並豁免超大市值公司滿足所有其他公司都需要滿足才能符合資格的財務可行性標準。2026年6月4日，該公司宣佈放棄擬議的修改，聲明「不應僅基於市值授予財務可行性、成熟度和IWF（可投資權重因子）要求的例外」。除標普道瓊斯指數外，尚無關於主要指數撤銷為SpaceX做出的修改和例外的大規模報道。2026年5月1日，納斯達克100實施了一項新的「快速進入」規則，允許按市值排名前40的公司在上市第七天就有資格被納入。富時羅素（FTSE Russell）也效仿了。正如《華爾街日報》報道的那樣，該公司「修改了規則，使新上市的大型公司更容易進入其美國指數，為被動投資者快速獲取SpaceX和其他備受矚目的上市公司的股票打開了大門」。

　　指數提供商對新公開募股的不同處理方式可能導致投資者對股票敞口的預期出現差異。此外，正如一位分析師警告的那樣，這些不斷變化的政策「可能在‘被動’指數之間造成顯著的回報差異」。

　　對於投資於為SpaceX放寬規則的指數基金的投資者，這些修改可能導致他們被迫購買數十億美元的SpaceX股票，而他們對此沒有任何發言權。突然間，美國人的退休儲蓄或養老金可能與SpaceX的市值掛鉤。股票的普遍性將人為推高其價值，而SpaceX內部人士——得益於允許他們比往常更早出售股票的特殊規則——將能夠迅速拋售其股份，讓散戶投資者接盤。結果可能是巨大的財富向上再分配——即使SpaceX沒有盈利。簡而言之，這些修改可能使一項金融工程計劃得以實施，該計劃操縱美國資本市場以 favor 馬斯克先生及其盟友。正如一位《金融時報》評論員所言，「為什麼標普道瓊斯指數公司……似乎在 flirt with 一項放寬規則的修改，以允許埃隆·馬斯克的衛星到AI公司快速進入？」這是SEC和指數提供商應該向公衆回答的問題。

　　有利於SpaceX的修改不僅限於指數——大型資產管理公司也在做出改變。2026年6月4日，管理着16.4萬億美元資產的富達投資（Fidelity Investments）「將其SpaceX IPO准入要求從高達50萬美元大幅削減至僅2，000美元」，為歷史上最大的股票首秀之一向數百萬散戶投資者敞開了大門。因此，SpaceX新IPO的風險不僅限於大型機構投資者，還將波及小型個人投資者，因為此次IPO似乎缺乏通常存在的許多投資者和市場保護。

　　在考慮SpaceX IPO對投資者的風險時，您還必須考慮到，這些風險將因SpaceX股票被納入主要指數以及通過主要資產管理公司和投資顧問向散戶投資者開放而立即被放大。這創造了一種情景：當前SpaceX股東——包括特朗普政府高級官員——可以在危及美國投資者和我們金融穩定的同時使自己致富。

　　其他需要推遲生效的問題

　　除關於SpaceX財務披露、公司治理以及操縱股市指數以利於自身的諸多擔憂外，還有三個其他考慮因素需要推遲公司註冊文件的生效，並要求SEC進行徹底調查。首先，存在潛在證券法違規的問題，即關於SpaceX初始私人備案的泄露。早在SpaceX於2026年4月1日向SEC提交保密註冊聲明之前，新聞報道就攜帶了關於招股說明書內容的信息，並引發了投資者興趣。如果這些泄露是SpaceX為在IPO前增加市場興趣而進行的協調嘗試的結果，可能構成證券法第5條的違規，該條款禁止「搶跑」（gun-jumping）——在提供註冊聲明之前出售或宣傳股票。法律規定，「除非註冊聲明對某種證券已生效，否則任何人直接或間接……使用州際貿易或郵件的任何交通或通訊手段或工具，通過任何招股說明書或其他方式出售該證券，均屬違法。」由於SpaceX在任何註冊聲明之前就已受到關於上市的非同尋常的公衆關注，SEC應加強對SpaceX IPO策略的審查，以確保公司未違反第5條。

　　其次，存在馬斯克先生在X上發布關於公司的聲明所引發的市場混亂問題——X是他也擁有的社交媒體平台，現在屬於SpaceX的xAI部門。一些金融記者認為，這些聲明與SpaceX公開備案文件中的業務信息存在實質性矛盾。無論這些偏差是否重大，馬斯克先生以在X上憑一時興起發布公開聲明而聞名，這些聲明可以瞬間撼動市場。他還以儘管未實現宏大的業務目標卻兌現鉅額薪酬方案而聞名。如果這種行為模式持續下去，將對SpaceX的可信度產生重大懷疑，以及其備案的IPO是否充分告知投資者與馬斯克先生相關的風險。

　　關於證券法違規和馬斯克先生矛盾聲明的擔憂，足以讓SEC推遲SpaceX註冊聲明的生效，並允許市場有一段冷靜期，以更徹底地評估SpaceX IPO的合理性。

　　結論與問題

　　SpaceX的IPO似乎為股東和未來公開公司上市呈現了獨特且開創先例的風險。公司的會計和財務報告存在令人不安的漏洞，並被今年早些時候發生的大規模且不透明的xAI合併所籠罩。公司的公司治理結構將獨特的權力授予其首席執行官，並嚴重限制股東權利。主要股指在放棄舊規則或制定新規則以允許SpaceX納入方面的共謀，意味着數十億美元的被動投資將被迫進入該公司，使退休人員和普通投資者面臨風險。

　　簡而言之，投資者和公衆對SpaceX及其計劃如何使用其尋求募集的數十億美元存在衆多未解答的重大問題。SEC不應在未經嚴格審查SpaceX財務報表、公司治理結構及其可能對散戶投資者（包括通過指數基金）的影響的情況下，加速SpaceX註冊聲明的生效。

　　我要求您在2026年6月23日之前，對以下問題提供詳細答覆：

　　SEC打算如何評估SpaceX關於其估值的主張，基於其對太空旅行、多行星居住和「將意識之光延伸到星辰」等主張？請包括關於以下方面的具體信息： a． 任何潛在的高估來源 b． SpaceX提出的估值（1.75萬億美元）與其營收（每年190億美元）之間的差異

　　SEC確保投資者獲得清晰準確披露的計劃是什麼，儘管存在複雜的會計問題？請提供關於以下方面的具體信息： a． 近期xAI收購的估值 b． 聯合創始人離職的影響 c． SpaceX各子公司（包括髮射、星鏈和xAI）的營收和虧損，包括星鏈用戶群的行業標準信息 d． 承銷銀行之間任何潛在的利益衝突 e． SpaceX審計師的嚴謹性和獨立性，包括任何潛在的利益衝突 f． 任何可能對SpaceX股票價值產生重大影響的預期未來合併或重大交易

　　SEC是否認為，從保密備案草案泄露的信息已實質性增加了市場對SpaceX首次公開募股的興趣？

　　鑑於有報道稱保密備案草案的信息被不當泄露，可能構成「搶跑」，SEC是否考慮過推遲SpaceX的首次公開募股？

　　SEC在評估IPO時，計劃如何考慮SpaceX的公司結構——該結構將幾乎完全的控制權授予一個人？請提供關於以下方面的具體信息： a． 其雙重股權結構 b． 埃隆·馬斯克對投票權的控制 c． 董事會成員的獨立性，鑑於他們與控股股東馬斯克先生的個人和業務關係 d． SpaceX與馬斯克先生控制的其他實體之間潛在的利益衝突交易

　　SEC計劃如何保護被動投資者免受SpaceX股票的風險，包括： a． 機構投資者（如養老基金），以及 b． 被動指數基金的股東

　　SEC是否會尋求SpaceX關於州法院對《交易法》索賠管轄權結論的法律依據？

　　此致

　　伊麗莎白·沃倫 銀行、住房與城市事務委員會 資深成員（Ranking Member）

　　TIM SCOTT SOUTH CAROLINA， CHAIRMAN

　　ELIZABETH WARREN MASSACHUSETTS， RANKING MEMBER

　　MIKE CRAPO， IDAHO

　　JACK REED， RHODE ISLAND

　　MIKE ROUNDS， SOUTH DAKOTA

　　MARK R． WARNER， VIRGINIA

　　THOM TILLIS， NORTH CAROLINA

　　CHRIS VAN HOLLEN， MARYLAND

　　JOHN KENNEDY， LOUISIANA

　　CATHERINE CORTEZ MASTO， NEVADA

　　BILL HAGERTY， TENNESSEE

　　TINA SMITH， MINNESOTA

　　CYNTHIA LUMMIS， WYOMING

　　RAPHAEL G． WARNOCK， GEORGIA

　　KATIE BOYD BRITT， ALABAMA

　　ANDY KIM， NEW JERSEY

　　PETE RICKETTS， NEBRASKA

　　RUBEN GALLEGO， ARIZONA

　　JIM BANKS， INDIANA

　　LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER， DELAWARE

　　KEVIN CRAMER， NORTH DAKOTA

　　ANGELA D． ALSOBROOKS， MARYLAND

　　BERNIE MORENO， OHIO

　　DAVID McCORMICK， PENNSYLVANIA

　　JANIE FAULKNER， STAFF DIRECTOR

　　JON DONENBERG， DEMOCRATIC STAFF DIRECTOR

　　United States SenateCOMMITTEE ON BANKING， HOUSING， AND URBAN AFFAIRSWASHINGTON， DC 20510-6075

　　June 9， 2026

　　The Honorable Paul Atkins

　　Chair

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission

　　100 F Street NE

　　Washington， DC 20549

　　Dear Chair Atkins，

　　I write with extreme concern regarding the upcoming initial public offering （IPO） of Space Exploration Technologies Corp． （「SpaceX」）． According to reports， SpaceX， an aerospace and artificial intelligence company owned by Elon Musk， seeks to target a valuation of upwards of $2 trillion and raise up to $75 billion from investors in its offering later this month – making it 「the largest stock-market debut in history．」 However， this IPO appears to present significant risks to ordinary investors and their retirement savings – while carrying enormous advantages for SpaceX insiders， including senior Trump Administration officials．

　　The risks associated with SpaceX‘s public offering are caused by a confluence of concerns revealed by the company’s filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission （「SEC，」 or 「the Commission」） and other public reporting： first， 「SpaceX is expected to offer stock at roughly 100 times 2025 revenue — a valuation multiple with little precedent， and one that requires numerous leaps of faith around both the AI and space theses；」 second， a non-traditional governance structure that will leave SpaceX‘s CEO， Elon Musk， with an unprecedented level of power， and investors with significantly fewer rights than those traditionally offered to purchasers of public shares； and third， major stock index providers rewriting their rules to fast track SpaceX’s entry into their indexes — and into the investment funds that power millions of Americans‘ retirement savings．

　　The net result could be disastrous： a scenario where retirees‘ and families’ investment accounts take a hit if SpaceX‘s valuation falters， with little recourse for any corporate misconduct， while the wealthiest man on earth becomes even wealthier due to a lack of oversight． The SEC’s core mission is to protect investors and maintain fair， orderly， and efficient markets． Given the unprecedented threats to investor protection and market integrity posed by the biggest IPO in history， you must delay any eventual acceleration of the registration statement‘s effectiveness accordingly． Before the company is allowed to go public， the SEC must investigate whether index funds and other financial entities involved in SpaceX’s IPO are adequately protecting investors， and the company must fill disclosure gaps related to valuation， ensure risks and details related to its concentrated governance structure are clear to investors， and abandon mandatory arbitration to provide shareholders whose rights are otherwise gutted in this structure a minimum avenue for recourse．

　　SpaceX‘s IPO Process and the SEC’s Role

　　SpaceX has been privately held since its founding by Elon Musk in 2002， raising approximately $9 billion in equity capital through private markets． Remaining private has allowed Mr． Musk to retain extensive control over the company． Mr． Musk， in addition to being the founder， serves as Chief Executive Officer， Chief Technology Officer， and Chairman of the Board， in addition to being the controlling shareholder． Earlier this year， SpaceX combined with another privately held company founded and controlled by Mr． Musk， xAI， in 「the biggest merger in history．．． to create a $1.25 trillion giant．」 SpaceX filed its IPO registration statement with the SEC on May 20， 2026， having reportedly filed a confidential registration around April 1， 2026． If the SpaceX IPO goes through at the target valuations， the 「blockbuster listing will unlock vast new wealth for SpaceX executives and investors ．．． But all of the holdings pale in comparison to the riches that Musk will unlock． He holds [vested shares] which could be worth about $700bn． A successful listing could see him become the world‘s first trillionaire．」

　　Before allowing a company to sell its shares to the public， the Commission is required to consider 「the public interest and the protection of investors．」 In so doing， the Commission may review the company‘s preliminary prospectus 「for compliance with the applicable accounting standards and the disclosure requirements of the federal securities laws and regulations．」 The massive size of the SpaceX IPO alone， under normal circumstances， would justify careful SEC review and attention to investor needs． But these are not normal circumstances： a number of additional factors exacerbate concerns and require action by the SEC to meet its investor protection and market integrity mandates by delaying the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　SpaceX‘s Valuation and Accounting

　　The value of SpaceX shares – now and in the foreseeable future – appears to be based on a uniquely speculative series of events． According to the Financial Times， SpaceX‘s finances today 「are of no use in working out what the company is worth，」 in part because of the inherent challenge of valuing activities that don’t yet exist but could be part of the growth of a company whose lofty mission is to 「extend the light of consciousness to the stars．」 According to a report from Morningstar， SpaceX may be worth less than half of the $1.75 trillion valuation it seeks．

　　Indeed， 「[a]t the valuation of $1.75tn previously reported by Financial Times， SpaceX would be the U.S． stock market‘s seventh-largest company． However， when ranked by its revenue of $19 billion a year， it would be 200th， on par with Lucky Charms cereal maker General Mills．」 The market has 「never before had to price a stock so speculative yet so large，」 and 「[t]he big question is whether a valuation as large as $1.8 trillion can be sustained in public markets．」 Part of the problem is the impossibility of accurately valuing SpaceX’s lofty goals， including space travel and interplanetary habitation． But it is also the product of the company‘s consistent negative profitability， and on its failure to meet past goals． As a result， market analysts have raised concerns about the math underlying SpaceX’s target valuation， calling it 「nonsensical，」 「smoke-and-mirrors accounting，」 and 「truly out of this world．」 If that valuation cannot be sustained， the investors who have chosen to buy in at lofty valuations – or will be forced to do so because of their investments in index funds， that are themselves based on indexes that have amended their rules to include SpaceX – will pay the price．

　　Additionally， the IPO‘s value is set in part by SpaceX’s 2026 merger with xAI． Since Elon Musk was on both sides of the transaction， 「he negotiate[d] the deal with himself， set the relative valuations himself， sign[ed] the merger agreement， close[d] the deal， and then [told] the boards and shareholders about it．」 This gave Mr． Musk an opportunity to inflate the valuation of xAI in excess of its assets – in other words， unilaterally deciding the value of his own transaction – and roll this into the upcoming IPO． The SEC should evaluate whether transactions and other relationships between SpaceX and xAI （as well as the full web of other companies under Elon Musk‘s control） present risks to investors from inaccurate or misleading accounting or valuation． Given the range of both active and passive investors who will be exposed to SpaceX’s risk， valuations that are not supported by fundamentals may threaten the integrity and stability of our capital markets．

　　The SpaceX-xAI merger is one in a series of common-control transactions between different business entities controlled by Mr． Musk – raising questions about any future plans SpaceX might have to integrate with Musk-controlled firms． For example， should Tesla and SpaceX merge as the business press has speculated， it could instantly trigger Mr． Musk‘s $1 trillion Tesla pay package due to a change in control provision that voids the performance conditions previously required to unlock the shares． Converting these new Tesla shares into new SpaceX shares could have significant implications for SpaceX shareholders． If plans do in fact exist to merge Tesla and SpaceX， such plans should be disclosed to prospective investors， as they should be considered materially important to the business strategy of the company and subsequent value of the public offering． Given that SpaceX’s S-1 makes no mention of the effect such a merger would have on SpaceX‘s valuation – even as it acknowledges that business transactions with Mr． Musk’s other ventures may occur – the SEC should conduct a thorough inquiry into Mr． Musk‘s future intentions regarding the ownership structure of his many powerful businesses before accelerating the effectiveness of SpaceX’s registration statement．

　　Post-IPO Corporate Governance

　　The IPO also poses concerns because SpaceX‘s post-IPO governance structure erodes fundamental shareholder rights and vests an extraordinary level of corporate power in Mr． Musk． Publicly traded companies are meant to be accountable to their shareholders． The SpaceX IPO will flip this model on its head， with shareholders providing billions of dollars in new capital with no accountability measures for Mr． Musk or company leadership， as the company 「[combines] supervoting shares， mandatory arbitration， stricter rules on shareholder proposals and Texas corporate law to give control to SpaceX CEO Elon Musk and other insiders． SpaceX also will limit investors’ ability to challenge management， sue in court， and force proxy contests．」

　　As leading corporate law scholars put it， 「even Musk admirers should be troubled by SpaceX‘s governance．」

　　SpaceX‘s preliminary prospectus indicates that the company will maintain a dual-class share structure， with each share held by Mr． Musk holding 10 times as much voting power as a share of the class offered to the public． Such asymmetry will deny shareholders any power over major corporate decisions like acquisitions， divestments， or restructuring． As the company’s prospectus admits， 「Mr． Musk will be able to control the outcome of matters requiring shareholder approval．」 In addition， the proposed governance structure essentially eliminates the Board of Directors‘ authority to manage the company， stripping it of the ability to fire the Chief Executive Officer： 「Musk can only be removed as chair or chief executive by a majority vote of the class B shareholders — and personally controls 93.6 per cent of the share class — in effect guaranteeing his position．」 As the editorial board of the Financial Times put it， 「[t]raditional governance checks are almost entirely absent．．．． [Musk] will have a virtually unchallengeable grip on voting rights and the board．」

　　Compounding the problem is that 「among [other] atypical arrangements， SpaceX does not plan to have the majority of its board be independent directors，」 including 「not us[ing] a committee of independent board members to determine executive compensation， as most companies do．」 Musk‘s position is likely to be entrenched by the presence of his powerful friends on the board of directors， including Antonio Gracias and Steve Jurvetson． Mr． Gracias and Mr． Jurvetson are reportedly personally close to Mr． Musk and competitors in the market for GPS signals． This raises corporate governance concerns， and runs the risk of violating antitrust laws banning interlocking directorates in which corporate directors sit on the boards of their competitors．

　　SpaceX is also attempting to limit shareholders‘ access to the courts for legal remedies． According to its S-1 filing， SpaceX plans to insulate Musk from legal risk by forcing most shareholders’ suits into arbitration， a process hidden from public view and systematically tilted in favor of the company‘s interests． Importantly， arbitration would be the only option for suits under federal securities law， because the Texas Business Court – SpaceX’s preferred forum for legal disputes – does not have jurisdiction over the relevant federal securities laws， contrary to the S-1‘s assertion that the law in this area is 「unsettled．」 While the provision may not ultimately be enforceable， such an attempt has been made possible by the SEC’s recent reversal of a longstanding position that forced arbitration clauses in IPOs were not in 「the public interest and protection of investors．」 Furthermore， 「SpaceX has opted for a provision that allows only shareholders holding 3 per cent or more of a company‘s shares to bring a so-called ’derivative‘ lawsuit on behalf of the company suing the board or chief executive， like the Tesla pay complaint filed by a tiny investor in the more shareholder-hospitable Delaware． Should SpaceX hit its expected $1.75tn valuation， a suing shareholder would need a stake of at least $52.5bn．」 SpaceX also intends to protect Musk’s unilateral control over the company by raising the threshold for shareholder proposals， prohibiting most of its investors from forcing a vote at a shareholder meeting．

　　The degree of Mr． Musk‘s power over SpaceX is especially concerning because of the conflicts that will inevitably arise between his interests and those of SpaceX’s shareholders and investors． The company‘s prospectus says as much： In its amended filing with the SEC， SpaceX admits that 「[c]onflicts of interest could arise in the future between us， on the one hand， and Mr． Musk and entities owned by or affiliated with him， on the other hand， concerning among other things， business transactions， potential competitive activities or other business opportunities． In the normal course of business， we have engaged in a variety of transactions with some of these companies．」 It continues： 「Mr． Musk or his affiliates may become aware， from time to time， of certain business opportunities （such as acquisition opportunities or technological developments） and may direct such opportunities to other businesses in which they have invested， in which case [investors] may not become aware of or otherwise have the ability to pursue such opportunity．」 The prospectus also details how Mr． Musk – a corporate director with fiduciary obligations to SpaceX – may also own assets in other companies that compete with SpaceX：

　　Under our charter， Mr． Musk and his affiliates are not restricted from owning assets or engaging in businesses that compete directly or indirectly with us and will not have any duty to refrain from engaging， directly or indirectly， in the same or similar business activities or lines of business as us， including those business activities or lines of business deemed to be competing with us， or doing business with any of our customers or vendors． Moreover， we have in the past entered into， and may in the future enter into， transactions with entities affiliated with Mr． Musk． We may enter into such transactions in lieu of pursuing other opportunities that some other shareholders may prefer or that may prove to be more accretive than the opportunities we elect to pursue．

　　These provisions of SpaceX‘s prospectus indicate that its IPO will be the biggest in history and may also have the most rigged corporate structure in history． Should the IPO be approved in its current form， the uniquely unchecked power Musk will have at SpaceX creates serious concerns for investors， markets， and the public at large． This IPO ultimately sets a dangerous precedent for future IPOs．

　　Effects on Passive Investors and the Capital Markets

　　The valuation and corporate governance concerns regarding SpaceX raise significant concerns about market integrity should its IPO‘s effectiveness be accelerated． For investors who pick and choose their specific investments， they at least are able to avoid investing in companies that engage in risky or unfair practices． But the SpaceX IPO creates a new concern： that major stock market indexes are being rigged in a way that would force millions of investors in passive index funds – a generally lower cost investment option that can be attractive to retail investors – to invest in SpaceX and face exposure to SpaceX’s significant risks with no choice in the matter． 「Analysts estimate conservative forced buying of $15 billion to $30 billion across S&P 500， Nasdaq-100 and Russell 1000 trackers in the months after inclusion， with more aggressive float-weighted scenarios running far higher．」

　　In addition to the above-average allocation of publicly traded stocks to retail investors， SpaceX‘s IPO will expose both passive and active investors to significant risk．

　　Major stock indexes have a clear set of rules to determine whether and when to add new companies． These rules provide important investor protections for stock purchasers from the volatility and uncertainty of newly-public IPOs and allow market discovery to establish a fair price for public companies prior to index inclusion． The rules typically include seasoning and viability requirements． For example， the S&P 500 has required that companies be publicly traded for at least twelve months and have at least four quarters of positive income prior to index inclusion．

　　But SpaceX has reportedly lobbied index providers to change the rules for inclusion on their indices． And the index providers have complied， with changes that would make it easier for large technology companies like SpaceX to be fast-tracked into passive investors‘ portfolios． In April， S&P Dow Jones announced it was considering changes to its rules to more easily enable 「MegaCap」 companies – the largest companies on the stock market – to be fast-tracked onto its indexes． For the S&P 500 alone， the firm was considering changes that included reducing the standard 12-month post-IPO waiting period to six months， eliminating the standard 10 percent float requirements， and exempting MegaCap companies from the financial viability criteria that all other companies are expected to meet in order to qualify． On June 4， 2026， the company announced it was foregoing the proposed changes， stating that 「exceptions to the financial viability， seasoning， and IWF （investable weight factor） requirements should not be granted solely based on market capitalization．」 Other than S&P Dow Jones， there has not been reporting of major indexes reversing changes and exceptions to long-standing rules that will be made for SpaceX． On May 1， 2026， the Nasdaq 100 implemented a new 「fast entry」 rule， which would allow companies in the top 40 by market capitalization to be eligible for inclusion on their seventh day of trading． FTSE Russell has followed suit． As the Wall Street Journal reports， the firm 「changed its rules to make it easier for freshly minted megacaps to enter its U.S． indexes， opening the door for passive investors to quickly access shares in SpaceX and other high-profile listings．」

　　A divergence among index providers‘ approaches to new public offerings may lead to different investor expectations around stock exposure． Additionally， as one analyst warned， these shifting policies 「could create significant return dispersion [between] ’passive‘ indexes．」

　　For investors in index funds that do bend the rules for SpaceX， the changes may lead to the forced purchase of billions of dollars of SpaceX stock without them having any say in the matter． Suddenly， American retirement savings or pensions may be tied to SpaceX‘s market capitalization． The stock’s ubiquity would artificially jack up its value， and SpaceX insiders – thanks to special rules allowing them to sell their shares sooner than usual – would be able to quickly sell off their shares， leaving retail investors holding the bag． What results could be a massive upward redistribution of wealth – even should SpaceX not be profitable． In short， these changes may enable a scheme of financial engineering that rigs America‘s capital markets in favor of Mr． Musk and his allies． As one Financial Times commentator put it， 「Why on earth is [S&P Dow Jones Indices]．．． seemingly flirting with a rule-bending change to allow Elon Musk’s satellites-to-AI company a quick entry？」 This is a question the SEC and the index providers should answer for the public．

　　Changes benefitting SpaceX are not limited to indexes – they are also being made by large asset managers． On June 4， 2026， Fidelity Investments， a firm with $16.4 trillion in administered assets， 「slashed its SpaceX IPO entry requirement from as much as $500，000 to just $2，000，」 opening one of the biggest stock debuts in history to millions of retail investors． The risk from SpaceX‘s new IPO will therefore not be limited to large institutional investors， but also small individual investors as the IPO appears to lack many of the investor and market protections that are typically in place．

　　As you consider the risks to investors from SpaceX‘s IPO， you must also factor that such risks will be immediately magnified by the inclusion of SpaceX stock on the major indexes and its availability to retail investors through major asset managers and investment advisors． This creates a scenario where current SpaceX shareholders – including senior Trump Administration officials – can enrich themselves while endangering American investors and the stability of our financial markets．

　　Other Issues Warranting Delayed Effectiveness

　　In addition to the multitude of concerns regarding SpaceX‘s financial disclosures， corporate governance， and efforts to rig stock market indexes in its favor， three other considerations warrant delaying the effectiveness of the company’s registration documents and demand thorough investigation from the SEC． First， there is the matter of potential Securities Act violations in the form of leaks regarding SpaceX‘s initial private filing． Well before SpaceX’s confidential SEC registration statement was filed on April 1， 2026， news reports carried information about the contents of the prospectus and generated investor interest． If these leaks were the result of a coordinated attempt by SpaceX to increase market interest in advance of an IPO， it might constitute a violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act， which prohibits 「gun-jumping」 – selling or publicizing shares before a registration statement has been provided． The law provides that 「Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security， it shall be unlawful for any person， directly or indirectly ．．． to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise．」 Because of the extraordinary publicity surrounding SpaceX going public in the advance of any registration statement， the SEC should increase scrutiny of SpaceX‘s IPO tactics to ensure that the company has not violated Section 5．

　　Second， there is the market confusion that has ensued from Mr． Musk making statements regarding the company on X – the social media platform he also owns， now under the xAI segment of SpaceX． It appears to some financial journalists that these statements materially contradict business information included in SpaceX‘s public filing． Whether or not the deviations are material， Mr． Musk is well-known to have a propensity to make public statements on X on whims that can instantly move markets． He is also known to cash out on large pay packages despite not meeting lofty business goals． If this pattern of behavior continues， it casts significant doubt on SpaceX’s credibility， and whether its IPO as filed sufficiently informs investors of the risks involved with Mr． Musk．

　　Concerns regarding a Securities Act violation and contradictory statements made by Mr． Musk give enough reason for the SEC to delay the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration， and allow the markets a cooling-off period to more thoroughly evaluate the soundness of SpaceX’s IPO．

　　Conclusion and Questions

　　The SpaceX IPO appears to present a unique and precedent-setting risk for shareholders and future public company offerings． The company‘s accounting and financial reports contain troubling gaps， and are clouded by the massive and opaque xAI merger that occurred earlier this year． The company’s corporate governance structure vests unique power in its CEO and severely limits shareholders‘ rights． And the complicity of major stock indices in waiving old rules or creating new ones to allow SpaceX’s inclusion means that billions of dollars of passive investments will be forced into the company， putting retirees and ordinary investors at risk．

　　In short， there are a multitude of unanswered material questions investors and the public have about SpaceX and what it is likely to do with the billions it seeks to raise． The SEC should not accelerate the effectiveness of SpaceX‘s registration without serious scrutiny of SpaceX’s financial statements， governance structure， and the impact it may have on retail investors， including through index funds．

　　I request detailed answers to the following questions no later than June 23， 2026：

　　How does the SEC intend to evaluate SpaceX‘s claims about its valuation on the basis of its claims regarding such things as space travel， multiplanetary habitation， and 「extending the light of consciousness to the stars」？ Please include specific information about： a． Any potential sources of overvaluation b． The discrepancy between SpaceX’s proffered valuation （$1.75 trillion） and its revenues （$19 billion per year）

　　What is the SEC‘s plan to ensure investors receive clear and accurate disclosures despite complex accounting issues？ Please provide specific information about： a． The valuation of the recent xAI acquisition b． The impact of co-founder departures c． The revenues and losses of each of SpaceX’s subsidiaries， including Launch， Starlink， and xAI， including industry-standard information on Starlink‘s subscriber base d． Any potential conflicts of interest among underwriting banks e． The rigor and independence of SpaceX’s auditors， including any potential conflicts of interest f． Any intended future mergers or major transactions that could have a material effect on the value of SpaceX stock

　　Does the SEC believe that leaked information from the draft confidential filing has substantially increased market interest in SpaceX‘s initial public offering？

　　Has the SEC considered delaying SpaceX‘s initial public offering， given reports that information from the draft confidential filing was leaked improperly and could be considered 「gun-jumping」？

　　How does the SEC plan to account for SpaceX‘s corporate structure， which vests nearly complete control in one person， in its evaluation of the IPO？ Please provide specific information about： a． Its dual-class share structure b． Elon Musk’s control of voting shares c． The independence of board members， given their personal and business relationships with Musk， the controlling shareholder d． Potential conflicted transactions between SpaceX and other entities Musk controls

　　What does the SEC plan to do to protect passive investors from the risks of SpaceX stock， including： a． Institutional investors （like pension funds）， and b． Stockholders of passive index funds

　　Will the SEC seek the legal basis for SpaceX‘s conclusion that the jurisdiction of state courts over Exchange Act claims is unsettled？

　　Sincerely，

　　[Signature]

　　Elizabeth Warren

　　Ranking Member

　　Committee on Banking， Housing， and Urban Affairs

　　Footnotes：

　　Bloomberg， 「What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，」 Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-05-29/what-to-know-about-the-spacex-ipo．

　　Bloomberg， 「Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，」 Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-poised-to-enrich-trump-officials-who-hold-millions-in-stock．

　　Financial Times， 「More takeaways from an S-1 for the ages，」 Craig Coben， May 26， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， 「SpaceX‘s Capital Needs Are Out of This World」 Chris Bryant， June 3， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2026-06-03/spacex-ipo-elon-musk-capital-needs-are-out-of-this-world．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026039276/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　New York Times， 「The Numbers， and Questions， Behind Musk‘s Mega-Merger，」 Andrew Ross Sorkin et al．， February 3， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/02/03/business/dealbook/spacex-xai-merger.html．

　　SpaceX， Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， May 20， 2026， https：//www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1181412/000162828026036936/spaceexplorationtechnologi.htm．

　　Reuters， 「SpaceX files for IPO， sources say， offering investors stake in Musk‘s space ambitions，」 Echo Wang， Manya Saini， and Joey Roulette， April 1， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/spacex-registers-take-rocket-maker-public-blockbuster-ipo-bloomberg-news-reports-2026-04-01/．

　　Financial Times， 「Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，」 Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/a59be3cf-eee2-4b10-9c86-b6e4dc0dbbdb？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77h； 17 C.F.R． § 230.461（b）．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， 「Filing Review Process，」 Sept． 27， 2019．

　　Financial Times， 「How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，」 May 21， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/58fcca43-9195-49e2-b1c3-0e3bfb0147cd？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　CNBC， 「SpaceX is worth less than half of its $1.75 trillion IPO target， Morningstar says，」 Joseph Wilkins， June 3， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/06/03/morningstar-spacex-ipo-target-price-nasdaq.html．

　　Financial Times， 「How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，」 May 21， 2026．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， 「What to Know About the SpaceX IPO，」 Anthony Hughes， May 29， 2026．

　　Fortune， 「Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，」 Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/05/29/spacex-ipo-should-i-buy-bear-case-david-trainer/．

　　New York Times， 「How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，」 Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/05/26/technology/spacex-elon-musk-pay-board-governance.html．

　　Financial Times， 「How to make sense of SpaceX‘s nonsensical valuation，」 May 21， 2026．

　　The Motley Fool， 「Honestly， the SpaceX Prospectus Is Far Worse Than I Imagined，」 Sean Williams， May 26， 2026， https：//www.fool.com/investing/2026/05/26/the-spacex-prospectus-is-far-worse-than-i-imagined/．

　　Fortune， 「Top analyst has harsh words for SpaceX debut： ‘We recommend that investors avoid this IPO’，」 Shawn Tully， May 29， 2026．

　　Bloomberg， 「Musk‘s Moonshot Merger，」 Matt Levine， February 3， 2026．

　　Forbes， 「Elon Musk，」 https：//www.forbes.com/profile/elon-musk/．

　　Fortune， 「Elon Musk‘s SpaceX buys xAI in stunning deal valued at $1.25 trillion ahead of looming IPO，」 Amanda Gerut， February 2， 2026， https：//fortune.com/2026/02/02/elon-musk-spacex-xai-ipo-trillion/．

　　Forbes， 「Could Musk Merge SpaceX And Tesla？ Here‘s What Analysts—And Betting Markets—Say，」 Ty Roush， May 27， 2026， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/tylerroush/2026/05/27/could-musk-merge-spacex-and-tesla-heres-what-analysts-and-betting-markets-say/； CNBC， 「Will Elon Musk eventually merge SpaceX with Tesla？ Speculation is building，」 Ananya Chetia， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/will-elon-musk-eventually-merge-spacex-with-tesla-speculation-builds.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「SpaceX-Tesla Merger Could Trigger Elon Musk‘s $1 Trillion Pay Package： Report，」 Badar Shaikh， June 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-tesla-merger-could-trigger-123106691.html．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Reuters， 「The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，」 Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/sustainability/sustainable-finance-reporting/spacex-ipo-lost-battle-shareholder-rights-rosskerber-2026-05-13/．

　　Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance， 「Even Musk Admirers Should Be Troubled by SpaceX‘s Governance，」 Lucian Bebchuk and Kobi Kastiel， June 2， 2026， https：//corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2026/06/02/even-musk-admirers-should-be-troubled-by-spacexs-governance/．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 2．

　　Id．

　　Financial Times， 「Inside SpaceX‘s audacious IPO plan，」 Ryan McMorrow et al．， May 20， 2026．

　　Financial Times， Editorial， 「To infinity and beyond， with the SpaceX IPO，」 May 22， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/0e5ab16c-957e-44d6-aa16-fe23412ef6df？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　New York Times， 「How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，」 Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， 「The Money and Drugs That Tie Elon Musk to Some Tesla Directors，」 Kirsten Grind et al．， February 3， 2024， https：//www.wsj.com/tech/elon-musk-tesla-money-drugs-board-61af9ac4．

　　「XONA Space Systems — Powerful Precise GPS，」 Steve Jurvetson， May 8， 2024， https：//steve.blog/2024/05/08/xona-space-systems-powerful-precise-gps/； PR Newswire， 「Xona Raises $92M to Rebuild Satellite Navigation for a New Era，」 June 26， 2025， https：//www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/xona-raises-92m-to-rebuild-satellite-navigation-for-a-new-era-302491586.html； PC Magazine， 「SpaceX to FCC： We Can Supply a GPS Alternative Through Starlink，」 Michael Kan， May 14， 2025， https：//www.pcmag.com/news/spacex-to-fcc-we-can-supply-a-gps-alternative-through-starlink．

　　15 U.S.C． § 19．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， pp． 63-64．

　　New York Times， 「How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，」 Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026； Capital Forum， 「Transcript of Conference Call on Forced Arbitration and Corporate Power in the Courts with Brendan Ballou，」 May 12， 2026， https：//thecapitolforum.com/resource/transcript-of-conference-call-on-forced-arbitration-and-corporate-power-in-the-courts-with-brendan-ballou/．

　　15 U.S.C． § 78aa （giving federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims brought under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934）．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 63．

　　U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， 「Sunshine Act Notice，」 September 10， 2025， https：//www.sec.gov/newsroom/meetings-events/sunshine-act-notice-open-meeting-091725．

　　Financial Times， 「SpaceX to drive a Cybertruck through corporate governance norms，」 Sujeet Indap， May 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/7f34d58b-da81-4778-bca1-7aa89b08afca？syn-25a6b1a6=1．

　　Reuters， 「The SpaceX IPO and the lost battle for shareholder rights，」 Ross Kerber， May 13， 2026； TradingKey， 「SpaceX IPO： Musk Controls 85.1% Voting Power， Shareholders Waive Jury Trials and Class Actions，」 Jay Qian， May 21， 2026， https：//www.tradingkey.com/analysis/stocks/us-stocks/261919584-elonmusk-spacex-ipo-tradingkey．

　　SpaceX， Amendment No． 1 to Form S-1， U.S． Securities and Exchange Commission， June 1， 2026， p． 57．

　　Id．

　　Id．

　　Social Science Research Network， 「The Growth and Consequences of Index Investing，」 Anne-Florence Allard et al．， January 12， 2026， https：//papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm？abstract_id=6056574．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「SpaceX IPO could hit popular index funds — and your 401（k） — in as little as 5 trading days as indexes relax their rules，」 Rudro Chakrabarti， June 1， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-ipo-could-hit-popular-101500534.html．

　　Id．

　　Bloomberg， 「Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，」 Matt Levine， May 26， 2026， https：//www.bloomberg.com/opinion/newsletters/2026-05-26/index-funds-can-t-say-no-to-spacex； Financial Times， 「Et tu， S&P 500？，」 March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　Business Insider， 「Here‘s when SpaceX could show up in major indexes and popular ETFs after its IPO，」 Naomi Buchanan， May 24， 2026， https：//www.businessinsider.com/spacex-ipo-index-investing-etfs-spy-vti-qqq-spcx-stock-2026-5； CNBC， 「Elon Musk’s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， Reuters sources say，」 March 10， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/03/10/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「Elon Musk‘s SpaceX Could Be Fast-Tracked Into S&P 500 After IPO Under Proposed Rule Changes，」 Badir Shaikh， May 2， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/elon-musks-spacex-could-fast-180121306.html．

　　Bloomberg， 「Index Funds Can‘t Say No to SpaceX，」 Matt Levine， May 26， 2026．

　　Id．

　　S&P Dow Jones Indices， 「S&P Dow Jones Indices Consultation on Treatment of MegaCap Companies，」 press release， April 30， 2026， https：//www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/indexnews/announcements/20260430-1483123/1483123_spdji-us-indices-megacaps-consult-20260430.pdf．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「SpaceX Faces Delay to S&P 500 Inclusion After Index Provider Keeps Existing Criteria （SPCX），」 Fiona Craig， June 5， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/spacex-faces-delay-p-500-100109864.html．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「Buckle Up， S&P 500 and Nasdaq Index Fund Investors． SpaceX Could Soon Become 1 of Your Largest Positions，」 Daniel Foelber， May 31， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/buckle-p-500-nasdaq-index-162000546.html．

　　FTSE Russell， 「Consultation for the Russell US Equity Indexes on the timing of IPOs and the treatment of companies with a high free float market capitalization，」 February 2026．

　　Wall Street Journal， 「FTSE Russell Latest to Make U.S． Index Inclusion Easier Ahead of SpaceX IPO，」 Joe Stonor， May 27， 2026， https：//www.wsj.com/finance/stocks/ftse-russell-latest-to-make-u-s-index-inclusion-easier-ahead-of-spacex-ipo-35157adf．

　　Post on X by Eric Balchunas， June 4， 2026， https：//x.com/EricBalchunas/status/2062647912065044532？s=20．

　　CNBC， 「SpaceX insiders will get to sell shares earlier than usual after the IPO，」 Leslie Picker， May 21， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/21/spacex-insiders-will-get-to-sell-shares-earlier-than-usual-after-the-ipo.html．

　　Financial Times， 「Et tu， S&P 500？，」 Robin Wigglesworth， March 26， 2026， https：//www.ft.com/content/59adbe42-ca30-47f3-9cda-5415945e9368．

　　RIABiz， 「Fidelity soars to $16.4 trillion of assets， a 16% jump of $2.3 trillion for 12 months， and widens gap on BlackRock and Schwab，」 Brooke Southall， August 14， 2025， https：//riabiz.com/a/2025/8/15/fidelity-soars-to-164-trillion-of-assets-a-16-jump-of-23-trillion-for-12-months-and-widens-gap-on-blackrock-and-schwab．

　　Yahoo！ Finance， 「Fidelity Cuts SpaceX IPO Eligibility by 99%， But 5 Rules Could Cost You Access，」 Lockridge Okoth， June 4， 2026， https：//finance.yahoo.com/markets/stocks/articles/fidelity-cuts-spacex-ipo-eligibility-183319186.html．

　　Bloomberg， 「Trump Officials Held Millions of Dollars of SpaceX Ahead of IPO，」 Annie Massa， Sophie Alexander， and Bill Allison， June 3， 2026．

　　New York Times， 「SpaceX Files to Go Public， Setting Stage for Huge I.P.O．，」 Ryan Mac， Lauren Hirsch， and Maureen Farrell， April 1， 2026， https：//www.nytimes.com/2026/04/01/technology/spacex-ipo-elon-musk.html．

　　See， e.g．， Reuters， 「Exclusive： Elon Musk‘s SpaceX weighs Nasdaq listing after seeking early index entry， sources say，」 Anirban Sen and Echo Wang， March 10， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/elon-musks-spacex-weighs-nasdaq-listing-after-seeking-early-index-entry-sources-2026-03-10/； Reuters， 「Exclusive： Musk rewrites IPO playbook with large slice of SpaceX stock for retail investors， source says，」 Echo Wang， Milana Vinn， and Sabrina Valle， March 26， 2026， https：//www.reuters.com/business/finance/musk-rewrites-ipo-playbook-with-large-slice-spacex-stock-retail-investors-source-2026-03-26/．

　　Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute， 「Gun Jumping，」 https：//www.law.cornell.edu/wex/gun_jumping．

　　15 U.S.C． § 77e； 17 C.F.R． § 230.135．

　　Forbes， 「Elon Musk‘s xAI Buys X — Here’s What That Means For You，」 Kate O‘Flaherty， March 31， 2025， https：//www.forbes.com/sites/kateoflahertyuk/2025/03/31/elon-musks-xai-buys-x-heres-what-that-means-for-you/．

　　CNBC， 「SpaceX skeptics have added reason for concern after Musk comments diverge from IPO filing，」 Lora Kolodny， May 29， 2026， https：//www.cnbc.com/2026/05/29/spacex-skeptics-concerned-as-musk-comments-diverge-from-ipo-filing.html．

　　CNBC， 「Elon Musk‘s tweets are moving markets — and some investors are worried，」 Sam Shead， January 29， 2021．

　　New York Times， 「How SpaceX Is Structured to Favor Elon Musk，」 Ryan Mac， May 26， 2026．

責任編輯：石秀珍 SF183